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I. INTRODUCTION

One doubts that Robert Carter, Thurgood Marshall,
Spottswood Robinson, Jack Greenberg and the rest of the legal team
that argued Brown v. Board of Education1 spent much time thinking
about mass torts. Nonetheless, it is entirely appropriate that a
commemoration of their achievements include not only that topic but
also international human rights and health care, as well as the more
expected ones of education and social welfare. Brown was part of a
revolution, and revolutions often have collateral effects as important
as their immediate consequences. The civil rights movement followed
the same pattern.
* David G. Price & Dallas P. Price Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. I am grateful both for
the opportunity afforded by the VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW to think about these themes and for
the comments by the symposium participants and by my colleagues, Richard Abel, Stuart Banner, Kenneth L. Karst, William Rubenstein, and Clyde Spillenger.
1.
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1); 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II).
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As an immediate consequence, that movement brought us
school desegregation.
Follow-on effects included desegregation of
public facilities. These were important milestones in U.S. society.
They achieved specific changes, but they also made possible the
second civil rights revolution-the legislative actions that have, in the
last four decades, transformed U.S. society. Beyond race and civil
rights, Brown created several ripples, two of which provide the focus
for this Essay.
First, Brown and the civil rights litigation movement helped
create a renewed belief, not just in the law, but more specifically in
litigation as a noble calling and as an avenue for social change. That
belief lies open to challenge, and it can leave students and lawyers
frustrated at the distance between the aspirations that brought them
to law school and the world of practice as they perceive it. But
whether or not it is well-founded, this belief, with roots traceable to
Brown and civil rights litigation, has endured for several generations.
Thus, Brown reshaped the aspirations of lawyers in ways that are still
important.
Second, Brown constituted an important step in the
restructuring of the U.S. bar. One of Brown's progeny, NAACP v.
Button,2 marked a first step in the relaxation of bans on solicitation
and the marketing of lawyers. In the wake of Button came greater
changes. Collectively those changes remade the world of practice,
particularly on the plaintiffs' side of the bar. We now have political
candidates who regularly campaign for or against the "trial lawyers,"
by which they mean the plaintiffs' bar. 3 To put this in perspective, it
is unthinkable that any national political candidate in 1954 would
have even thought it plausible to have a position on the plaintiffs' bar.
While Brown did not create this world, it constituted a very powerful
symbol of litigation as a transformative force, and the power of that
image helps explain the fact that the plaintiffs' bar regularly depicts
itself as the defender of constitutional rights. Brown and its sequels
made that slogan both plausible and attractive.
It gave to the
plaintiffs' bar, which was starting to reshape its finances and practice
setting, an image that involved more than vehicular accidents:
2.
371 U.S. 415, 439-40 (1963) (holding that a state bar's solicitation ban violated the
NAACP's First Amendment right to assist parties in civil rights litigation).
3.
In 2003 President George W. Bush made twelve speeches or public statements in which
he identified "trial lawyers" as a significant issue of public policy. Most of these came in assertions that "trial lawyers" had created a substantial problem in the availability of medical care by
filing frivolous lawsuits for medical malpractice, with the result that malpractice insurance premiums had increased so much that good doctors were either leaving practice, leaving the state,
or restricting their area of practice. 39 WKLY. COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DocS. 73, 109, 117,
289, 321, 776, 1142, 1253, 1361, 1459, 1523, 1767 (2003).
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plaintiffs represented by this bar were, like the plaintiffs in Brown,
vindicating rights suppressed by the defendants.
II. BROWN AND THE CULTURE OF LAWYERS
Brown gave us a model for social change through litigation, a
model in which civil litigators of sufficient dedication and creativity
could bring about deep, important social changes. That belief itself
marked a new vision of legal change.
Although several earlier generations of crusaders had sought
social change, Brown's successful use of litigation as an agent of social
change marked a departure. In the previous century, abolitionists had
tried to use the law to free slaves, but their struggle used legislation
and direct action. Courts entered the scene as the instruments of the
slaveholders, enforcing the Fugitive Slave laws and, in Dred Scott,
4
holding unconstitutional one of the abolitionists' legislative victories.
Perhaps not surprisingly, abolitionists saw the ballot box and the
bullet as much more likely weapons in the struggle against our
''peculiar institution."
Even after the Civil War and the Reconstruction, the courts did
not look like a hospitable forum for those seeking social change. On
one hand, courts "cast themselves in the role of protectors of
individual employees from coercion by unions"5 and enjoined strikes as
unlawful combinations. They played a similar role in "protecting"
workers from early wage and hour legislation, striking it down as an
infringement of freedom of contract. 6 The labor injunction of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was actively deployed to
preserve existing relationships of social power. 7 But when legally free
former slaves sought to invoke this apparently deep commitment to
individualism by challenging segregation in interstate transportation,
they found that the Fourteenth Amendment permitted a society that
was racially separate (though theoretically equal).8 One cannot blame
those who sought what they would describe as "progressive" social
change for not thinking first of litigation as the instrument of that
change.

4.

Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 449-50 (1857).

5.
CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND
THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960 48 (Louis Galambos & Robert E.

Gallman, eds., 1985).
6.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1905).
7.

OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 1-3 (1978).

8.

Plessy v. Ferguson, 165 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
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That perception persisted through the 1920s and 1930s. In the
era of the New Deal, idealistic young lawyers 9 went to work in
administrative agencies and the executive branch, or perhaps in
Congress. But they did not in the courts and not by using litigation as
an agent of social change. Their faith was perhaps best captured in
James Landis's "Storrs Lectures" in 1938, published as The
Administrative Process.10 Landis, who had just assumed the deanship
at Harvard Law School, well represented contemporary legal thought:
"The administrative process is, in essence, our generation's answer to
the inadequacy of judicial and legislative processes."1 1 When litigation
was on the agenda of these New Deal reformers, it chiefly served to
defend legislative and executive initiatives against hostile judicial
review. Few would have thought of the courts or civil litigation as an
agent of social change.
One can see this administrative and executive focus even in
one of the pathbreaking exceptions. At the very end of the New Deal,
there appeared an article about a then-obscure procedural device, the
class action. In The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 12 Harry
Kalven and Maurice Rosenfield sought to revitalize this somewhat
exotic device and to create a role for litigation as a tool of social
reform. Basic to their conception was the idea that such suits would
magnify and supplement the efforts of the administrative state:
This power of administrative bodies [to redress small harms visited on large numbers of
people] is still in the tentative stage, and there are, of course, many fields in which
administrative bodies have not made an appearance. As a consequence, whether it is
desirable or not, private litigation must still police large areas of modern law and
provide the exclusive remedy for many large-scale group injuries. It is the primary
concern of this article to explore the possibilities of revitalizing private litigation to
fashion an effective means of group redress. 13

For Kalven and Rosenfield, then, social reform litigation was still
primarily a function of the legislature and executive; litigation could
supplement but not supplant such efforts.
In the first half of the twentieth century, one could see
litigation as an agent of social change only in two areas, but it was on
9.
One is sorry to report that the more accurate phrase would be idealistic young men.
And that gender-specificity remained largely true in the civil rights litigation. Constance Baker
Mottley is the most notable of the relatively few women lawyers who worked with the NAACP
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. See generally JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE
COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION
(1994) (chronicling the history of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund).
10. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
11. Id. at 46.
12. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit,
8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684 (1941).
13. Id. at 687.
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the side of the forces against whom the Progressives and New Dealers
were working. The first arena lay in the legislation of the New Deal.
A number of its programs, especially in the early years, raised
constitutional issues.
A few were struck down. 14 More were
threatened. In either case, the task of these lawyers at the leading
edge of social change was to defend legislative and administrative
programs against judicial invalidation.
Such innovations as the
"Brandeis brief," which sought to bring to judicial notice facts drawn
from social science and legislative hearings, aimed at supporting with
nondoctrinal arguments legislation and administrative actions that
might otherwise succumb to judicial review. 15 In this area, then,
litigation played an important, but defensive, role. The second area
involved collective bargaining and the then-growing labor union
movement. As they had for decades, employers sought to use courts
and the injunction as a weapon against organizing and strikes. For
those on the union side, the question was not how to use the courts to
help the movement, but how to prevent them from harming it.16 This
point emerges most clearly in the work of Felix Frankfurter and
Nathan Greene, whose study of the labor injunction concluded that
courts should be stripped of jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief in
labor disputes.1 7 Legislation followed. 18 For those who thought of
themselves as social progressives, the best one could hope for from the
courts was to stay out of society's way. From the perspective of one
looking back on Brown, this recommendation is striking in its utter
rejection of the courts as a tool of social change. 19

14. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down the National Industrial Recovery Act §§ 3-10, 15 U.S.C. §§703-710 (1935)); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388 (1935) (same).
15. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 (1908) (brief submitted by Louis D.
Brandeis examining "the course of legislation as well as expressions of opinion from other than
judicial sources" on the sources of hour laws affecting female laborers); Bunting v. Oregon, 243
U.S. 426 (1917) (One thousand page brief defending a working-hour restriction); Vill. of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (brief submitted by Alfered Bettman, leader of National
Conference on City Planning, focusing on social need for urban planning, discussed in Richard
Chused, Euclid's HistoricalImagery, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 610 (2001)).
16.

See TOMLINS, supra note 5, at 61-67.

17.

FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 205-26 (P. Smith

1963) (1930).
18. The Norris-Laguardia Act stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to issue labor injunctions. Act of March 23, 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§101-15 (2004)).
19. In a wonderful reminder of the malleability of history, the civil rights era saw regular
efforts by those opposed to integration to adopt the labor model to civil rights, proposing various
jurisdiction-stripping legislation that would prevent federal courts from using injunctive relief in
the aid of integration. See, e.g., NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE
AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950'S 291 (1969) (describing how in the aftermath of

Brown, "[tihe result was the rise of a formidable anti-Court congressional bloc .... None [of
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It was in this climate that the NAACP began its long campaign
to challenge national racial segregation. Starting in the second decade
of the twentieth century, the Association sought and financed test
20
cases designed to attack various aspects of racial segregation.
Several have told the story of the line of cases that culminated in
Brown. 21 Two principal versions of the campaign have emerged. In
one, there is a master plan. In this version, funded by a grant of
$100,000,22 the Association's efforts began with a self-consciously
designed litigation strategy, written by Nathan Margold and approved
by the Association's leadership. The plan chose not to attack what
looked like the obvious target - the rampant inequality of educational
expenditure between black and white schools.
Such a plan,
challenging the nation to live up to the "equal" part of the "separate
but equal" ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson,23 was favored by some
segments of black leadership, including W.E.B. DuBois.24 Instead, the
designated strategy took direct aim at the constitutionality of racial
segregation, with schools as the focus of the efforts. 25 In part, this
strategy flowed from the Association's choice of litigation as a strategy
of social change. Margold, looking at limited resources to fund a
litigation effort, wrote, "[i]t would be a great mistake to fritter away
our limited funds on sporadic efforts to force the making of equal

their proposed legislation] referred directly to segregation, but all concerned the prestige of the
Court and challenged the whole philosophy of judicial activism from which the Brown decision
had in part emerged.").
20. Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910-1920), 20 LAW
& HIST. REV. 97, 122-28 (2002).
21. See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE : THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (Gryphon 1994) (1976); MARK V.
TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-

1961 150-216 (1994) (examining the factual, legal, and political antecedents leading to the Brown
decision); ARYEH NEIER, ONLY JUDGMENT: THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION IN SOCIAL CHANGE 46-57

(1982); GREENBERG, supra note 9, at 85-177; see also Susan D. Carle, From Buchanan to Button:
Legal Ethics and the NAACP, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 281, 283-84 (2001) (describing the
legal ethics challenges to two civil rights test cases).
22. TUSHNET, supra note 21, at 12-13 (pointing out as well that only part of the promised
funds materialized); Carle, supra note 21, at 118.
23. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896). Plessy was itself an effort to use litigation to affect social change. Railroads and civil rights groups had carefully arranged this test
suit, using what they believed was a sympathetic plaintiff in a sympathetic situation. Cheryl I.
Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1746-47 (1993).
24. NEIER, supra note 21, at 49 (describing how DuBois foresaw two centuries of segregation and worried about the generations of black schoolchildren who would suffer as a result);
TUSHNET, supra note 21, at 179.
25. GREENBERG, supra note 9, at 57-58.
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divisions of school funds .. . ."26 A second version of the same
campaign emerges in the work of other scholars. 27 In this version, the
process of case selection was more fortuitous and less calculated.
Constantly called on to balance the needs and claims of local
chapters-many of whose members sought immediate amelioration of
stark inequalities in funding and facilities-the NAACP was often
distracted from the single-minded focus called for by Margold. In
attacking
teachers' salary cases, for example, the NAACP found itself
28
not the core of racial segregation, but some of its results.
For my purposes it is not critical to resolve the extent to which
the litigation leading to Brown was an unbroken line from a plan
made in 1931 to a Supreme Court case decided in 1954, or whether the
The
route contained more detours dictated by circumstances.
in
its
important point about this effort lies not in its inspiration but
exceptionality. Between 1930 and 1950, the courts were not the
institutions that came first to the minds of those seeking social
Even Kalven and Rosenfield's important, pioneering
change.
justification of class suits saw such litigation as an adjunct to
administrative action: the private attorney general was to perform
the functions that the real attorney general was simply too busy to
cover. 29 Litigation was a supplement to, not a replacement for, and
certainly not the antagonist of, national governmental power and
policy.
Brown changed everything. Brown provided an inspiration and
a model for several generations of lawyers. Brown also suggested that
a carefully designed litigation strategy, supported by modest
resources, could remake the social landscape. Both ideas were heady.
26. Memorandum from Nathan Margold, Preliminary Report to the Joint Committee Supervising the Expenditure of the 1930 Appropriation of the American Fund for Public Service to
the NAACP 93 (A31), quoted in NEIER, supra note 21, at 48.
27. TUSHNET, supra note 21, at 152-55. See also William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106
YALE L.J. 1623, 1627-30 (1997) (describing, for example, the fortuity of the NAACP's involvement
in Shelley v. Kramer).
28. TUSHNET, supra note 21, at 20-26. In these cases the plaintiffs, black school teachers,
contended that their salaries were unequal to those of their white peers. Id. at 20-21. These
suits were in many respects natural for the NAACP, because teachers and other well-educated
community leaders were particularly likely to be members and supporters of the Association.
But these suits involved complicated factual demonstrations, because the usual line of defense
was that the teachers were paid less because they had lesser education or credentials. Id. at 23.
That question, in turn, required the plaintiffs to demonstrate that the generally segregated colleges that these teachers had attended were substantially equivalent to the institutions attended
by white teachers-a demonstration that not only stood at odds with the overall strategy of attacking segregated education as inherently unequal, but also required extensive and expensive
battles of experts.
29. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 12, at 687.
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In his critique of lawyers seeking social change primarily through
litigation, Gerald L6pez describes the way in which Brown's
pioneering effort began to become a branch of the legal profession:
I remember the arrival in the 1960s of the first wave of self-consciously
progressive lawyers to hit East L.A .....
We probably called them something nifty like
"legal aid" or "civil rights" lawyers, if we called them anything at all.
As lawyers they initially struck many of us as curious hybrids in the making.
Those among them who hadn't already embraced the 60s cultural revolution were in the
midst of a pretty obvious makeover. They seemed to be trying to take advantage of their
privilege and, at the same time, to shed the garb and the perks normally associated with
it. They seemed genuine, too, in their insistence upon coming to town specifically to
fight for us against the status quo. That fact was no small matter in those days,
although by itself, it didn't win over many of us, at least not for long.
But their very presence in East L.A. did suggest new strategic possibilities ....

30

The lawyers L6pez and his friends observed were the first wave
of what has become a broad public interest bar. Its members sought
mostly social change though litigation. 3' Writing in 1982, Aryeh
Neier, the former director of the American Civil Liberties Union,
described the rapid growth of "cause lawyering":
30. GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE
LAW PRACTICE 1 (Robert W. Gordon et al. eds., 1992).
31. More recently groups aiming at community economic development have emerged, typically combining transactional skills with community organizing, rather than litigation. See, e.g.,
Boston
College Law School Community Economic Development Law Group, at
http://www.bc.edu/bc-org/avp/law/st-org/pilf/pilfpages/ced.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2004) (describing themselves and the CED principles as "a group of law students interested in helping
people by applying their legal skills to develop communities economically ....
It is an area of law
that combines public interest law with basic transactional law, community activism, with pragmatic business principles."); Susan R. Jones, Pro Bono in Action: Revitalizing Cities with the
Help of Lawyers, BUS. LAW TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 64 ("[L]awyers may ultimately influence
economic development law and policy locally, regionally and nationally . .. [T]he ABA Business
Law Section created the CED Committee in the summer of 2001 to assist lawyers whose primary
practice or pro bono service is with low-to-moderate income entrepreneurs and community-based
organizations working to revitalize rural and inner-city American communities."). But within
the public interest bar, the litigation model still dominates. See, e.g., Trial Lawyers for Public
Justice, Welcome!, at http://www.tlpj.org/default.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2004) ("Trial Lawyers
for Public Justice is a national public interest law firm dedicated to using trial lawyers' skills
and resources to create a more just society. TLPJ fights for justice through precedent-setting
and socially significant individual and class action litigation ....
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice has special litigation projects that secure access to justice by battling unnecessary secrecy in
the courts, mandatory arbitration abuse, federal preemption of injury victims' claims, and class
action abuse."); NEW YORK LAWYERS FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, YEAR 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 4,
available at http://www.nylpi.org/nylpi_2000-ar.pdf ("NYLPI continues to meet the expectations
of its founders, combining an innovative and always evolving private bar involvement program
with an outstanding litigation and advocacy program working on behalf of low-income New
Yorkers in the areas of disability rights, access to health care, and environmental justice ... We
have expanded our practice to include environmental justice and community economic development, an area underserved in New York City and one that successfully combines the work of our
staff with that of our member firms.").
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The emergence of this "public interest" bar is recent. Two decades ago [the period
recalled in the passage from L6pez just quoted], it would have been possible to assemble
in one small living room all the lawyers in the United States professionally engaged in
advancing causes through litigation. Today they would overflow the grand ballroom of a
giant hotel. Virtually alone of the innovations of the 1960s, public interest litigation
thrives. ...
Organizations hiring lawyers to sue power companies or challenge sex
discrimination... are deluged with applications from outstanding graduates of the best
law schools. Public interest lawyers have become stock figures in popular novels and
television melodramas. They symbolize a convergence of idealism and professional
32
skill.

Neier's assessment finds numerous echoes, and most concur in
tracing the power of the image to Brown. Nan Aron, chronicling the
growth of public interest law, writes, "The civil rights movement is, in
many ways, the crucible in which modern public interest law was
forged. ' 33 That movement had several branches. One grew from
Ralph Nader's attack on General Motors as a menace to consumer
safety, which spawned the "consumerist" movement; Nader has linked
his own movement to Brown:
Brown... marked the rebirth of the civil rights movement, and, at the same time,
carried far-reaching implications for the legal profession. Here for the first time was a
movement of young and idealistic lawyers who were determined to use their skills to
create precedents - and advance the cause of justice. As the civil rights movement
grew, law students and lawyers began to sense dramatic changes taking place in the
law. More law graduates versed in social as well as legal theory applied their idealism
34
and commitment.

The images of practice generated by this movement had
powerful resonance. Some law students began either to forsake
traditional private practice or to demand that firms incorporate public
interest litigation into their practices. 35 Today one finds in U.S. law
schools "public interest" programs, students demanding that
placement offices focus more staff time and resources on public
interest employment, queries to private firms about the extent of their
pro bono practices, and more. The National Association of Law
32. NEIER, supra note 21, at 5.
33. NAN ARON, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN THE 1980S AND
BEYOND 8-9 (1989); see also Oliver A. Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1439-41
(1984) (describing the roots of the public interest law); Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social
Change: Perspectiveson Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207, 224-41 (1976) (describing the
"second wave" of public interest litigation, beginning in the 1960s and 70s and focusing on issues
such as consumer and environmental protection).
34. Ralph Nader, For the Preservationof the Public Interest, in TAKING IDEALS SERIOUSLY:
THE CASE FOR A LAWYERS' PUBLIC INTEREST MOVEMENT 125 (Robert L. Ellis ed., 1984).
35. Jerry J. Berman & Edgar S. Cahn, Bargainingfor Justice: The Law Students' Challenge
to Law Firms, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 16, 22 (1970) (reporting that the number of Harvard
Law School students entering private practice had dropped from 54 to 41 percent between 1964
and 1968).
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Placement collects statistics concerning students who find
employment in public interest organizations. 36
It is entirely possible to ask whether these professions of
allegiance are durable and whether pro bono and public interest
practice have proved the most effective levers of social change. Some
have asked whether lawyers most effectively spend their time in such
efforts. 37 Others have asked whether such efforts, even if nominally
successful, work lasting social change. 38 Perhaps the best evidence of
the widespread belief in the transformative power of litigation comes
from those who deploy the strategy of social change through litigation
in the service of ends opposed by Thurgood Marshall's successors. In
recent years, for example, the plaintiffs attacking the affirmative
programs of the University of Michigan's undergraduate and
professional admissions programs were supported by conservative
public interest affinity groups who described Supreme Court review in
the cases as part of a "long litigation campaign," 39 a campaign the
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund had sought to defeat. 40
Marshall and company created a powerful new image of the lawyer as
a catalyst for social change, social change that would occur at least in
part through litigation. Looking soberly back on the change in
professional consciousness wrought by the cause lawyering
exemplified in Brown, Aryeh Neier writes, "In the 1960s ... litigation

36. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR LAW PLACEMENT, JOBS & J.D.'S: EMPLOYMENT AND
SALARIES OF NEW LAW GRADUATES, CLASS OF 2002 12, 17-19, 41 (2003) (tracking placement,
salaries, credentials required, and breakdown in categories of public interest positions, which the
document distinguishes from "government" employment). NALP reports that in 2002 and 2003,
the most recent years for which data is available, approximately 27 percent of recent law school
graduates have accepted "public service" positions (a category that includes both judicial clerkships and military positions), and that about 3 percent have accepted the more narrowly defined
"public interest" positions. NALP, Class of 2003 and Class of 2002, Summary Findings, available at http://www.nalp.org/nalpresearch/newgrads.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). The latter
figure, NALP reports, represents the largest portion of recent graduates entering public interest
positions since the early 1990s. NALP, Class of 2003, Summary Findings, at 3, available at
http://www.nalp.org/nalpresearch/ersini03.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2004).
37. See Scott Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono (May 2004) (on file with author).
38. Compare GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 35-36 (Benjamin I. Page ed., 1991), with KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE,
LAW'S EXPRESSION: VISIONS OF POWER IN THE POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION 8-10
(1993).
39. Linda Greenhouse, Court to Revisit Colleges' Efforts to Regain Diversity, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 3, 2002, at Al ("Getting the issue back on the Supreme Court's docket is the culmination of
a long litigation campaign by a public interest group here, the Center for Individual Rights,
which opposes affirmative action and helped recruit the three unsuccessful white applicants who
are the plaintiffs in the two cases.").
40. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, NAACP LDF Applauds U Michigan Supreme Court Ruling (June 23, 2003), at http://www.naacpldf.org/content.aspx?article=58.
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seemed to be the way to deal with every question." 41 No one would
have thought so in 1952, on the eve of Brown. That the legacy of this
revolution had collateral effects unimagined by its participants would
not make it different from any other revolution.
III. BROWN AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE BAR
If Brown had only furnished lawyers and law students with an
enduring image of litigation as an agent of social change, it would be
worth remembering as part not only of a civil rights revolution but as
part of our broader legal culture. But Brown began a process that
may prove just as durable: the deregulation of the legal profession.
A. Deregulationas a Child of Brown
The campaign culminating in Brown required choosing a
progression of individual cases, each of which would aim at a
vulnerable chink in the legal armor of racial segregation. To engage
in such litigation, the NAACP and its Legal Defense and Education
Fund 42 had to do two things: select plaintiffs who would be both
sympathetic and steadfast and focus on claims that would serve the
long-range goals of desegregation as much as immediate relief to
individual clients. For example, a claim that a racially segregated
school received insufficient funding would, even if successful, do
nothing to integrate that school. If the NAACP stuck assiduously to
its plan, such a claim would not be pursued. 43 An opponent of the
integration effort could therefore attack in two ways: head-on, by
defending the constitutionality of existing segregation, or tactically, by
aiming at the process of case selection and control lying at the base of
the effort. Southern states, having failed in the former task, tried the
latter. The consequences for the legal profession are still with us.
Perhaps the best evidence that contemporaries understood
exactly what Brown represented came from six Southern states that,
within two years after Brown, had amended the regulations governing
their state bars. 44 These regulations aimed at challenging the tactics
41.

NEIER, supra note 21, at 213.

42. There is, of course, a history of occasionally tense relations between the parent Association and the Fund, which began life as a department of the Association and in time became a
separate legal entity, with goals that occasionally clashed with those of the parent. See
GREENBERG, supra note 9, at 19-20, 244-45, 478-81.
43. See supra text accompanying note 25.
44. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring and citing statutes
in Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and Tennessee, in addition to the Virginia statute at
issue in the case at hand).
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of solicitation and of strategic guidance of clients. 45 Both challenges
had their roots in a traditional picture of the lawyer as an agent whose
client would seek him out and who would then pursue all possible
lawful strategies to assist the client, taking instructions from the
client. 46 As Ben Sheppherd, the Attorney General of Texas, asserted
in 1956, the "p" in NAACP meant, "Pick the Place, Prepare the
47
setting, Procure the Plaintiffs, and Push them forward like Pawns."
If tighter state regulation could prevent the Association and the Fund
from seeking the right clients and from dictating overall litigation
strategy, those new regulations could cut off the flow of future cases.
It was a brilliant counterstrategy that almost succeeded. Just as
important, its rejection opened the way to a new picture of the lawyer
and the client, a picture with resonance far from social reform
movements.
The targets fought back, and the repercussions of the fight still
shape the contemporary legal profession. NAACP v. Button48 grew
from a declaratory action filed by the Association, which sought to
have declared unconstitutional several of the newly enacted portions
of Virginia's scheme for regulating lawyers. By the time the case
reached the U.S. Supreme Court, its focus was on a provision
broadening the scope of unlawful solicitation of legal business to
include "an agent for an ... organization which retains a lawyer in
connection with an action to which it is not a party and in which it has
no pecuniary right or liability." 49 The Virginia Supreme Court, correctly perceiving which "organization" this statute was aimed at, had
held that
under the expanded definition [of solicitation] ... activities [of the Association and
Fund] constituted "fomenting and soliciting legal business in which they are not parties ... and which they channel to the enrichment of certain lawyers employed by them,
50
at no cost to the litigants and over which the litigants have no control."

45. See, e.g., Carle, supra note 21, at 299 (discussing the South's post-Brown tactics: "These
initiatives were part of a broad campaign to cripple the NAACP's post-Brown desegregation efforts. Other legislative avenues included laws requiring political organizations to register and
disclose their membership lists to the state, use of reporting and disclosure requirements under
corporate and tax laws, and outright prohibitions against advocating school integration.");
GREENBERG, supra note 9, at 217-22 (describing the attempts of several southern states to hinder the NAACP's efforts). See generally TUSHNET, supra note 21, at 272-300.
46. Carle, supra note 21, at 300.
47.

TUSHNET, supra note 21, at 272.

48. 371 U.S. at 417-19 (the case was originally filed in 1957, but detours through several
layers of the Virginia and federal courts delayed its arrival in the U.S. Supreme Court).
49. Id. at 423 (citing Code of Virginia, 1950 §§ 54-74, 54-78, 54-79, as amended by Acts of
1956, Ex. Session ch. 33).
50. Id. at 426 (quoting NAACP v. Harrison, 116 S.E.2d 55, 66 (Va. 1960)).
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After nearly ruling against the NAACP (and two rearguments
of the case), 5 1 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the regulation, as
thus construed and applied to the plaintiffs, violated First
Amendment rights of "expression and association." As an immediate
effect, that holding lifted a cloud over the efforts at social reform
through litigation. More important for purposes of my argument,
Button did so in ways that made possible broader changes in the
plaintiffs' bar. For Button made its ruling in the light of some bad
facts. As described (in a footnote in the majority opinion and with
more emphasis in the dissent of Justice Harlan), Virginia presented
testimony that blank retainer letters were circulated at meetings
called by the Association's chapters and that several of the plaintiffs
in Virginia school litigation did not know they were parties to any
litigation and said they had never met with counsel. 52 Moreover,
Harlan accepted a finding that the overall strategy of litigation had,
"to a considerable extent" been shaped by the Association rather than
by clients. 53 Because those facts were bad if the case were seen from
the perspective of traditional models of the legal profession, the Court
necessarily had to bless them in reaching its conclusion that the
solicitation and litigation control of the Association were protected. It
did so: "[T]he State has failed to advance any substantial regulatory
interest, in the form of substantive evils flowing from petitioner's
activities, which can justify the broad prohibitions which it has
54
imposed."
The problem (or the opportunity) arose because, although
Virginia had acted with racial animus, it had used tools that were
entirely traditional. As Susan Carle has written, Button involved a
collision between an elite conception of lawyering for the public good
(even if those efforts involved a collision with rules of ethics) "and the
motives of those from a lower strata of the bar, who were engaging in
55
comparable activities with pecuniary, self-interested intent."
Indeed, Mark Tushnet has demonstrated that the ethical rules
involved were so traditional that the first draft of the opinion would
have acquiesced in Virginia's criminalization of the NAACP's
solicitation efforts. 56 For purposes of my argument, the NAACP's near

51. Mark Tushnet has unearthed archives indicating that only the resignations of Justice
Whitaker and Justice Frankfurter-and their replacement by Justices White and Goldberg-prevented the affirmance of the Virginia regulations. TUSHNET, supra note 21, at 278-82.
52. Button, 371 U.S. at 422, 450.
53. Id.; see also TUSHNET, supranote 21, at 281.
54. Button, 371 U.S. at 444.
55. Carle, supra note 20, at 100.
56. TUSHNET, supra note 21, at 272-300.
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loss emphasizes how close in concept were the Association's efforts to
those of many lawyers who were soliciting for reasons of profit rather
than principle. If it was lawful to solicit business en masse, and if it
was lawful for lawyers to process a case without much connection with
the individual client, many changes in the legal profession could occur.
And they did, though not all at once, because of limitations
inhering both in the opinion and in the circumstances that gave rise to
Button. First, Button had made much of the way in which the entities
behind the litigation (the Association and the LDF) were using
litigation as a form of political expression, and that they did not stand
to gain financially from their actions; indeed they were incurring
expenses, and these were the days before fee-shifting statutes. So the
holding seemed to have little application to the ordinary practice of
law, in which the lawyer's living and the client's financial
compensation were principally at stake. Second, precisely because the
Button plaintiffs engaged in litigation that was obviously
cause-related, the link to political action was clear. By contrast,
Button did not have immediately apparent application to ordinary
lawsuits, which did not seek a major reordering of social or political
relationships. Those applications emerged only as the Supreme Court
confronted implications of Button over the next fifteen years.
Change came in several steps. The year after Button, the Court
upheld the right of a labor union to establish a lawyer-referral system
for ordinary workplace injuries; 57 the opinion focused on the
associational ties of the union members, likening it to Button.58 This
small step was relatively easy because labor unions, like the NAACP,
had for years been engaged in various forms of political activity on
behalf of members. It was not a great stretch to see the referral
scheme as a form of collective, quasi-political action. However small,
the step was important because it suggested that a quite ordinary personal injury lawsuit could be a form of protected political action. In
the same year, another union successfully defended on similar
grounds a scheme in which it directly paid its own lawyers to handle
such claims on behalf of members. Citing Button, the Court said that
the protected associational values need not be ones of pressing
political importance. 59 Four years later came a case in which still
another union referred any injured member to a panel of outside
60
lawyers with whom it had negotiated a maximum contingent fee;

57.
58.
59.
60.

Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
Id. at 6-8.
United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n., 389 U.S. 217, 221-23 (1967).
United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576, 577-78 (1971).
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again, the Court held the state's contrary regulation unconstitutional.
Thus far, the shadow of Button fell principally on groups that looked
in many respects like the NAACP. Unions, like the NAACP, existed
for purposes other than litigation; they had organizational structure
and aims separate from the lawsuit, and they sought political goals
broader than their members' economic wellbeing. Moreover, like the
NAACP, they had long been disadvantaged by the law and had
emerged into positions of legitimacy and power only in the
mid-twentieth century. So in many respects it was easy for the Court
to assimilate their litigation efforts to those of the NAACP.
Then, a dozen years after Button, came an important sidestep
into another regulated industry. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., a consumers' group
obtained a declaration that it was unlawful for the state to prevent a
licensed pharmacist from advertising the price of prescription drugs.6 1
Board of Pharmacy took the Court further than its preceding cases in
several ways. First and obviously, there was no litigation "project":
the consumers' group just wanted price information so as to stimulate
competition. And while one might characterize the plaintiffs agenda
as political in a broad sense (and the majority did 62), it was far less
obviously so than that of the NAACP. Consumers, though they might
be flexing their muscles as a result of organizing efforts like those of
Ralph Nader, were neither a discrete and insular minority nor a
downtrodden group. Nevertheless, the Court, citing Button, and
elaborating the commercial speech doctrine, held that the ban could
not be justified by the state's desire to regulate the profession. But
the opinion was careful to say that its rulings did not necessarily
apply to medicine and law, where other considerations might dominate.
A year later it turned out that the distinctions between
pharmacy and law were not strong enough to prevent Button from
extending to the advertising of prices of common legal services-an
uncontested divorce or adoption, a personal bankruptcy, or a name
change. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona 63 traces its descent directly to
Button, because the obvious basis for challenging the bar's prohibition
on price competition through advertising-the Sherman Act 6 4-was off
limits: the so-called "sovereign action" limitation on the Sherman Act
61. 425 U.S. 748, 772-73 (1976).
62. See id. at 763 ("As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial
information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's
most urgent political debate.").
63. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
64. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et. seq. (2004).
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insulates from scrutiny uncompetitive rules specifically blessed by the
state. 65 Only Button's First Amendment lineage got the Bates Court to
its conclusion:
[A]dvertising by attorneys is not an unmitigated source of harm to the
administration of justice. It may offer great benefits. Although advertising might
increase the use of the judicial machinery, we cannot accept the notion that it is always
better for a person to suffer a wrong silently than to redress it by legal action.
[From the footnote appended to the preceding sentence:]Decided cases reinforce this
view. The Court often has recognized that collective activity undertaken to obtain
meaningful access to the courts is protected under the First Amendment. [Citations to
the union cases and Button omitted.] It would be difficult to understand these cases if a
lawsuit were somehow viewed as an evil in itself. Underlying them was the Court's
concern that the aggrieved receive information regarding their legal rights and the
means of effectuating them. This concern
applies with at least as much force to
66
aggrieved individuals as it does to groups.

This passage bears the marks of the NAACP's long campaign.
Litigation-and the solicitation of litigation-has become not a social
evil but a form of political expression and, in particular, an avenue for
plaintiffs (the "aggrieved") to learn of and to "effectuate" "legal rights."
With Bates, Button became the charter for a new view of the legal
profession and of litigation. Justice Powell, in dissent, understood the
implications and did not like them:
Although the Court appears to note some reservations (mentioned below), it is clear that
within undefined limits today's decision will effect profound changes in the practice of
law, viewed for centuries as a learned profession. The supervisory power of the courts
over members of the bar, as officers of the courts, and the authority of the respective
States to oversee the regulation of the profession have been weakened. Although the
Court's opinion professes to be framed narrowly, and its reach is subject to future
clarification, the holding is explicit
and expansive with respect to the advertising of
67
undefined "routine legal services."

One can disagree with Justice Powell's gloomy view of the
consequences while believing him correct about the structural change.
Bates, drawing its strength and doctrinal underpinnings from Button,
recast the legal profession in a new light-as a medium of political
action. Litigation, even ordinary civil litigation, became a form of
political right-seeking. Moreover, the power to invoke this right lies
not only in the hands of clients, but also in the hands of the
representatives-the lawyers-who can seek out and encourage those
who might wish to vindicate their rights.
Bates has drawn criticism not only from those, like Justice
Powell, who believe the deregulation of the legal profession was

65.
66.
67.

Bates, 433 U.S. at 359-63.
Id. at 376-77 (citations omitted).
Id. at 389 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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unwise. Another strand of critique comes from scholars and judges
who believe that, without regard to their effect on professional
regulation, doctrines of commercial speech rest on shaky
foundations. 68
For present purposes neither critique need be
confronted: my argument is positive rather than normative. Nor does
my argument involve the insistence that the present regulation of the
legal profession in Bates could not have happened without Brown and
Button. In a parallel universe we might have come to Bates had
Brown and Button never been decided. My argument is simply that
our path to deregulation did lie through Brown and Button, and that
the consequences of that particular, contingent path are still with us.
B. The Reconstitutionof the Plaintiffs'Bar
Button and its offspring created a deregulatory opening that
allowed the plaintiffs' bar to remake itself. It has taken the opening.
Three critical things have changed that bar. First, it has increased its
69
modal organizational size. Second, that bar has recapitalized itself.
Third, it has specialized. Each of these changes, sketched below, is
important. All were facilitated by the deregulation that, in our
history, traces itself to Button.
The modal size of the practice organization in which U.S.
lawyers operate has increased over the past fifty years. Many have
watched with a mixture of awe and horror the much-chronicled
emergence of the megafirm, with hundreds or thousands of lawyers.
But, even so, most lawyers do not practice in such settings. For my
purposes the more important change came at the lower end of the
practice spectrum. Until 1960 more than half of all U.S. lawyers
practiced alone.70
Some of these lawyers were excellent, fully

68. See, e.g., Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 94 (2d
Cir. 1998) ('The parties' differing views as to the degree of First Amendment protection to which
Bad Frog's labels are entitled, if any, stem from doctrinal uncertainties left in the wake of Supreme Court decisions from which the modern commercial speech doctrine has evolved. In particular, these decisions have created some uncertainty as to the degree of protection for commercial advertising that lacks precise informational content."); Alan Howard, The Constitutionality
of Deceptive Speech Regulations: Replacing the Commercial Speech Doctrine with a Tort-Based
Relational Framework, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1093, 1119 (1991) ("Thus, even if a commercial
speech categorization could serve some purpose, the court's inability to fashion a coherent definition of commercial speech undermines its usefulness. Such an uncertain definition disserves
judges, who need clear doctrinal guidance, and exacerbates the chill of protected speech.").
69. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183, 198-211
(2001) (describing changes in the legal marketplace resulting in financial parity between the
plaintiffs' and defense bars).
70.

RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 300 (1989) (reporting on tabulation of lawyers

listed in Martindale-Hubbell).
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justifying their folkloric status; many more were marginal, barely
71
scraping by and doing their clients few favors in the process.
Describing the situation of this segment of the bar a few years after
Brown, Jerome Carlin chronicled their meager professional and
economic means. 72 Lacking the intellectual or financial capital to take
their cases deep into litigation, they were forced to hope for a quick
73
settlement.
In the closing decades of the twentieth century this segment of
the bar reconstituted itself in ways that were facilitated by the
deregulation that followed from Button. Two basic changes occurred.
First, the modal practice group increased in size-not from one to a
hundred lawyers but from one to a few. In California, a survey
conducted by the State Bar in 2001 found that of the lawyers in
private practice-almost 80 percent of all active lawyers-more than
half practiced in firms with between two and twenty lawyers. 74 More
precisely, 30 percent of all lawyers in private practice were in firms of
between two and five lawyers; 27 percent of the same group were in
firms of between six and twenty lawyers. 75 Patterns obviously differ
among regions, and one would expect, all things being equal, that
urban practices would be more likely to contain groups of lawyers
than those in rural areas.
Nevertheless, the slow national
disappearance of the solo practitioner tells us that California is not
unrepresentative.
The changes represented by this shift in practice demographics
are qualitative rather than quantitative and, together with the modest
deregulation of practice, transformative. The shift from a solo practice
to a six- or ten-lawyer firm was enormous not only in crude statistical
terms, although it is worth noticing that such a change dwarfs in
percentage terms the growth of many of the highly celebrated or
condemned megafirms.
More important than the statistical
transformation, however, is the potential for mutually supportive
practices.
Herbert Kritzer's important work in describing the

71.

See

JEROME

E.

CARLIN,

LAWYERS

ON

THEIR

OWN:

A

STUDY

OF

INDIVIDUAL

PRACTITIONERS IN CHICAGO 205, 208-09 (1962) (characterizing solo practitioners as at the "bottom of the status ladder" and questioning whether most of these attorneys' work should properly
be considered lawyers' work as opposed to bookkeeping and brokering).
72. Id. at 87-90. In his second edition, published in 1994, Carlin finds solo practitioners
complaining that the "plaintiffs' bar," characterized as specialists in firms, are taking away the
solo practitioners' most profitable injury cases. JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN:
THE SOLO PRACTITIONER IN AN URBAN SETTING xxi-xxii (Austin & Winfield 1994).

73. Id.
74. Survey Finds Bar Makeup is Shifting, But Slowly, CAL. ST. B.J., Nov. 2001, at 1 (reporting a survey of 1500 randomly selected CA lawyers).
75. Id.
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conditions of life in the plaintiffs' bar in Wisconsin shows us how this
effect works out in practice. 76 These small practice groups typically
77
work across a spread of case types: some low-fee, high realization
cases like workers' compensation representation, some relatively
routine vehicle injury cases on a contingent fee, where careful case
selection, good investigation, and experience in dealing with the
insurance industry and its lawyers will yield a flow of higher but less
certain fees; and a case or two characterized by high risk and high
potential recovery (for example, a product liability case with uncertain
liability but high damages). This diversification of case "portfolio"
may not yield enormous returns-Kritzer reports a number of
excellent plaintiffs' lawyers who have never collected a million dollar
verdict-but it will enable the lawyers involved to make a decent
living, at an imputed hourly rate comparable to that of their defense
counterparts. 78 One of Kritzer's most striking findings was that the
imputed hourly return to these plaintiffs' lawyers (the total return per
hour of lawyer time) was just slightly higher than the hourly rates of
the lawyers on the other side, paid by the insurance carriers. 79 This
finding is important in two respects. At the time Brown was decided,
ordinary plaintiffs' lawyers inhabited economic and professional
76.

See IN LITIGATION: DO THE "HAVES" STILL COME OUT AHEAD (Herbert M. Kritzer &

Susan S. Sibley eds., 2003); Herbert M. Kritzer, From Litigators of Ordinary Cases to Litigators
of Extraordinary Cases: Stratification of the Plaintiffs' Bar in the Twenty-First Century, 51
DEPAUL L. REV. 219, 227-239 (2001) (describing various pressures leading to changes in the legal
profession, such as increased specialization/stratification and practice consolidation); Herbert M.
Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What Does the Empirical Literature
Really Say, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1977-78 (2002) (arguing that a firm's ability to diversify its litigation portfolio, thereby hedging its risk, depends on the firm's size); Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven
Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 782 (2002) (suggesting that
personal injury law firms may yield higher returns than other types of firms because of a combination of "expertise and efficiencies that the lawyers are able to obtain"); Herbert M. Kritzer, The
Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice,47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 304 (1998)
(describing various lawyers' portfolio practices and noting the influence of firm size and reputation on these strategies) [hereinafter Kritzer, Wages of Risk]. Much of this work is collected in
HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE
IN THE UNITED STATES (forthcoming August 2004).

77. Those who study law firms use "realization" to describe the rate at which lawyers are
paid for the hours they invest in clients' work. A high realization rate means efficient billing and
collection, a function both of the lawyers' practices and of the clients' ability and willingness to
pay. See, e.g., F. Leary Davis, Back to the Future: The Buyer's Market and the Need for Law Firm
Leadership, Creativity and Innovation, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 147, 171-72 (1994) (describing a
management initiative: "Tactics adopted to improve realization address the issue of how firms
can collect for as much of the work they do as possible. These tactics, including improved timekeeping and billing procedures, improved letters of engagement and disengagement, and appropriate utilization of technology, benefited [sic] both firms and their clients.") (emphasis omitted).
78. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk, supranote 76
79. Id. at 302 ("The returns from contingency fee practice are at best 'somewhat better' than
what lawyers earn from hourly fee practices.").
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universes entirely different from those of their defense counterparts.
Today, some commentators argue that plaintiffs' lawyers as a group
grow fat off the land.8 0 For my purposes, even the finding of equality
with defendants' lawyers is big news.
The growth in modal firm size does more than permit economic
stability. In most cases it qualitatively improves the legal product
coming from these firms. Again, the reasons are relatively easy but
very important to see. Apart from financial stability, a lawyer with
five or ten colleagues can do a better job on any given case because she
has quick and cheap access to others' expertise and experience.
Anyone in a law firm or law faculty knows that a five minute
conversation with someone who has dealt with a question before will
save twenty hours of research. Just as important, a half-hour
conversation about basic case strategy will often result in an
exponentially stronger approach to the entire matter. One of the
many important lessons flowing from the litigation team behind the
cases leading to Brown is that the discussed case is the better-litigated
case. The NAACP provided not only a constitutional landmark but
also a model for the effectiveness of a small group of plaintiffs' lawyers
with slender financing but a deep grasp of litigation strategies. The
change in practice groups was not sufficient to produce higher-quality
lawyering, but it was probably necessary.
The reference to Brown also, however, highlights an important
difference between the ordinary plaintiffs' bar and the NAACP
lawyers. Although they suffered from deep disadvantages, the NAACP
lawyers, because of their basic strategy, had one very significant
advantage over the lawyer representing the traffic accident victim: in
lawsuits, law is relatively cheap, but facts are typically expensive.8 1
As the Margold report recognized2, the NAACP could easily dissipate
all its funds by trying to use Plessy as a lever, attacking unequal
funding on a county-by-county basis.
The frontal assault on
segregation flowed as much from litigation budgets as from strategic
planning or moral vision: by choosing a strategy in which facts didn't
matter much-to the point of stipulating, as they did in some cases,

80. Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing Data
and Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 653, 664 (2003) (disputing Kritzer's findings and
arguing that many contingent fee lawyers earn unethically high contingent fees). But see Herbert M. Kritzer, Estimating Effective Hourly Rates: Lester Brickman's Junk Science and Questionable Scholarship (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (forthcoming 2005).
81. Modern discovery regimes require staged investments in document requests and production, depositions, experts, and the like, which produce expenses substantially greater than
those involved in legal research.
82. Neier, supra note 21, at 48.
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that the funding of the dual school systems was equal-they kept
litigation expenses down.
That path will not be open to most plaintiffs' firms, because
their cases will, by and large, turn on facts rather than on law.
Developing facts, particularly in realms where interpretation of facts
requires expert witnesses, is expensive. We have chosen a litigation
system that requires-and rewards-extensive pretrial investigation
and discovery.8 3 Lawyers operating on a contingent fee basis and
spending substantial sums on discovery8 4 have to be well and stably
capitalized. This fundamental capital requirement shapes modern
practice. Lawyers who are handling a portfolio of contingent fee cases
need both diversification and a steady flow of work to handle the capital requirements of effective representation.
Brown via Button and Bates indirectly address this
Bates (and cases that followedrequirement of capitalization.
who had suffered specific kinds of
clients
to
solicit
allowing lawyers
harms, and then to advertise generally)8 5 allows lawyers to do mass
advertising, creating the possibility of a flow of cases into the office.
That flow can then be sorted. Cases can be screened along several
dimensions: the size of the potential recovery, the strength of the
merits, the estimated investment required, and the area of practice
involved. The last two criteria are related. It costs much more for a
lawyer to develop or extend an area of practice than for her to take a
83. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Vanishing Trial: ABA Section on Litigation Symposium,
December 2003, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES (forthcoming 2004); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322 (1986) ("In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." By thus aligning the burdens of
production at summary judgment with the burdens of production at trial, the Court's opinion
forced parties to make effective use of the discovery process in order to avoid summary judgment).
84. At common law, a lawyer could not advance expenses to support litigation. See NATHAN
M. CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE PROFESSION (2d

ed. 2000). Today most jurisdictions today allow the contingent advancement of litigation expenses. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (2003) (permitting a lawyer to advance litigation expenses and court costs on a contingent basis and allowing a lawyer to simply
pay the litigation expenses and court costs if the client is indigent); see also MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt.10 (2003) (prohibiting lawyers from subsidizing their clients' lawsuits because of the increased risk of frivolous claims and a potential conflict of interest created
by the lawyers increased financial stake in the litigation).
85. Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 111 (1990)
(holding unconstitutional a state law prohibiting designation of certification in a lawyer's advertising materials, as an abridgement of First Amendment protections); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n.,
486 U.S. 466, 477 (1988) ('The record before us furnishes no evidence that scrutiny of targeted
solicitation letters will be appreciably more burdensome or less reliable than scrutiny of advertisements.") (citing Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 379 (1977)).
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case in a familiar area.8 6 Recent interesting work by Dr. Sara Parikh
has documented the vigor and effectiveness of the referral system
among Chicago plaintiffs' lawyers.8 7 Cases regularly move up and
down among members of the bar according to the area of expertise and
the required size of the investment.8 8 A big-case firm is likely to refer
small cases down the ladder, fully expecting that a smaller firm will
refer a large case upwards. Referral fees also follow this chain.8 9 The
combination of advertising and a vigorous referral system thus has
created a market in claims representation in which a plausible claim
is quite likely to get into the hands of a competent lawyer who can
invest the amount necessary to reach a good result for the client. This
situation represents a fundamental change in the conditions of legal
representation.
Brown did not create the modern plaintiffs' bar. It was
certainly not a sufficient cause, and it may not even have been
necessary. One cannot say that we would not have found our way to
the same point if desegregation had occurred as a result of legislation,
a constitutional amendment, or gradual social change. The years in
question saw a number of deregulatory moves in fields far from the
legal profession: airline travel, contraception and family planning,
trucking fees, federal control over broadcast and telephonic
communications, and numerous other areas now operate under far
less stringent regulatory regimes than they did at the time Brown and
Button were decided. It requires no heroic assumptions to believe that
we might well have found ourselves in the same place in regard to the
legal profession without Brown or Button. But it is just as important
to note that, in our real, contingent world, our path to the present
traveled though Brown.
It is important so to note because two separate, roughly
parallel paths of intellectual and social history moved out from Brown.
One was what we might call the cultural aspirations of law students
and some lawyers: to use law and litigation as a tool of social change,
as the plaintiffs in Brown had done. The second was the professional
86. At a minimum, the lawyer will need to spend more time in familiarizing herself with the
applicable law than if she were navigating in familiar waters; she may also need to associate
herself with other lawyers in the new field, thus diminishing her share of any recovery.
87. Sara Parikh, Plaintiffs' Practitioners:Competition and Cohesion in the Personal Injury
Bar, 14 RESEARCHING LAW: AN ABF UPDATE 2 (2003).
88. Id. at 3-5.
89. Forty states have formally abandoned restrictions on referral fees, and experienced observers report that even where prohibitions persist they are rarely observed. See, e.g., id. at 3;
CRYSTAL, supra note 84, at 238 (reporting that despite the prohibition against referral fees embodied in the old MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107(A)(2) (1980), "the practice of
referral fees appeared to be fairly widespread in the profession").
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arena in which those cultural aspirations might play out. Through
Button, Brown allowed the reforming of plaintiffs' practices. Most of
those changes did not occur in the name of social change as the Brown
plaintiffs understood that phrase. The lawyers in question were often
looking for a more profitable practice rather than a new vision of
social justice. But the two were linked together: the plaintiffs' bar
could wrap itself in the mantle of defenders and vindicators of rights,
even if those rights were subconstitutional. One can see this heritage
in the most homely places; in many U.S. cities, buses carry ads-in
several languages-that solicit business for plaintiffs' lawyers, who
regularly portray themselves as "defenders" of rights. 90
By the same token, those attracted to the "vindication of rights"
stance could see litigation as a path to the vindication of rights. And,
as the plaintiffs' bar gradually reorganized itself, it amassed both the
financial and the intellectual capital to conceive of projects grander
than the representation of individuals who had suffered injuries on
the job or the highway. This is not the place for histories of the
environmental or consumer movements, but both of them can lay
claim to Brown as at least a distant forebear. Both could plausibly
claim that they were seeking to vindicate previously unrecognized
rights of large groups. Closer to the civil rights movement, both could
also claim to be the litigation extensions of affinity groups: Ralph
Nader and Co. served as the analogue to the NAACP for consumers;
organizations like the Sierra Club and the National Resources Defense
Council did so for the environmental movement. For my purposes the
important connection is all these groups had strategies that sought
social change both through affinity-group organization and through
litigation.
Even more significant, in both cases the litigation
movement had two branches. One, funded by affinity group dues
(and, later, partially through fee-shifting statutes) sought change that
benefited the public at large. Another branch sought what looked
more like individual redress-the suit in which an individual plaintiff
sought damages for a violation of consumer or environmental laws,
vindicating the values they protected by calling the defendant to
account. Such cases formed a bridge between the social reform
90. See, e.g., Lawyer Juan J. Dominguez, Advertisement with detachable leaflets (obtained
May 29, 2004) (on file with author). The advertisements were distributed on certain Los Angeles
County Metropolitan Transportation Authority buses. The front of the advertisement simply
says "Accidents" and provides the attorney's name and a toll-free, twenty-four hour telephone
number. The reverse side presents an "Accident Guide." On this guide, accident victims are
prompted to collect pertinent data, including date and time, driver's license information, insurance information, witnesses' contact information, and diagrams of the front and back side of a
body, where victims are instructed to 'Mark on the body figures any area of pain or injury from
the accident. Indicate any swelling, bruising, cuts, soreness, etc."
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litigation exemplified by Brown and the next generation of social
reform litigation, which ambiguously combined strands of self- and
public interest.
The bridge between these two generations rested on two
pylons, one a theory formed while Brown was still a gleam in the eyes
of Thurgood Marshall, and the other statutes enacted in the wake of
Brown's success.
The theory, elaborated by Harry Kalven and
Maurice Rosenfield, enabled those who sought damages to describe
themselves as "private attorneys general," vindicating the public
interest by allowing regulatory statutes to be uniformly and widely
enforced. 9 1 Kalven and Rosenfield's original article described a new
function for the still unusual class action. By vindicating group rights,
such actions, which the authors imagined as based chiefly on
regulatory statutes such as securities laws, would harness
self-interest to the common good, supplementing the enforcement
actions of governmental officials. This is a powerful and attractive
idea. In a market economy, one would like to think that individual
rights and the public interest can be joined, that one can do well by
doing good, and do good by doing well.
This possibility was reinforced by an important change in the
financing of some lawsuits-the fee-shifting statute.
When the
NAACP and its affiliates filed Brown and Button, the cost of litigation,
including attorneys' fees, was borne by the groups sponsoring the
litigation. Indeed, that fact was one of the motivations behind the
Southern states' strategy restricting solicitation: not only would they
prevent "outsiders" from stirring up trouble, as they saw it, but
without access to a funding base, even homegrown litigants would be
hard pressed to mount a strong case through the inevitable several
layers of appeal. Nor did the Supreme Court cooperate. After some
early cases in which lower courts awarded attorneys' fees on a "private
attorney general" theory, the U.S. Supreme Court held that it was
inappropriate for federal courts to use their common law powers in
this way absent Congressional authorization.9 2 Congress responded
promptly with legislation providing for the award of attorneys' fees "in
any action or proceeding to enforce a provision [of specified civil rights
statutes]. ' 93 Moreover, the context of the legislation-designed to
support plaintiffs' cases-was sufficiently clear that, in spite of the
apparently symmetrical command of the statute that such fees should

91. See generally Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 12, at 721.
92. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 270-271 (1975).
93. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2004)).
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be awarded to "the prevailing party," the Court a few years later
interpreted this language to mean that the prevailing plaintiff,but not
prevailing defendants, should get such fees. 94 The Court that so
decided was probably correct; the image in the Congressional mind
was that of the NAACP plaintiffs, and it was unthinkable that, had
they lost Brown, they would have been liable for the attorneys' fees of
half a dozen states.
Given my argument, one cannot imagine the fee-shifting
statutes except in the wake of Brown and the more general acceptance
of litigation as a form of social and political action. But to appreciate
the significance of these statutes, it is worth imagining an alternative
history. Suppose, in a parallel universe, the U.S. had judicially or
legislatively created a fee-shifting arrangement in cases vindicating
constitutional rights. Now imagine the strategic choices facing the
NAACP in 1930.
It would have been financially as well as
strategically possible to attack segregation with the levers suggested
in Plessy v. Ferguson,95 arguing that the actual facilities, from school
buildings to teachers to textbooks were not equal. That path was the
one favored by W.E.B. DuBois, who feared, correctly as it turned out,
that the frontal attack on segregation would consume decades and
leave a generation of children to suffer the ill effects of segregated
education. 96 One cannot know which course the Association would
have taken. But it would have been a choice, not a conclusion dictated
as much by the economics of litigation as by moral vision and master
planning.
As with so many of the collateral effects of the social revolution
instigated by Brown, the fee-shifting statutes took on a life of their
own, independent of the movement for racial justice, but very much a
part of the transformation of the legal profession. Scores of federal
statutes and a couple of thousand state statutes carried such
provisions by the middle of the 1980s. 97 Such statutes have a dual
effect: first, they testify to legislative acceptance of social change
through litigation, and they cast reflected legitimacy on the portion of
the bar-typically representing plaintiffs-who conduct such cases.
Second, they provide another source of financing for the bar and make
some number of low-value, higher-risk cases economically feasible.
94. Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978). The only exception to
this principle was in cases where it was shown that the plaintiff had acted in bad faith in bringing the suit.
95. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896).
96. See supratext accompanying note 24.
97. Note, State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the American
Rule?, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321, 322-23 (1984).

2000

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:6:1975

Fee-shifting statutes have not proved to be a magic carpet for
claimants, even civil rights claimants. For example, the existence of
these statutes has not yet produced a robust plaintiffs' bar in
employment discrimination. 98 But the existence of these statutes
embeds in U.S. law the idea of a plaintiffs' bar engaged in litigation as
a means of social change. With that image we can step aside from the
path I have been tracing and consider some implications of these
changes.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS: SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE POLITICS OF ORDINARY
LITIGATION

One regularly reads of plaintiffs who announce that they are
suing, not Oust) for the compensation, but because they are "seeking
justice" or because they "want to send a message." Some of these
people are doubtless insincere. Others have absorbed and internalized
the litigation revolution of which Brown v. Board of Education was the
central example: not just the legal culture, but the broader general
culture, has come to conceive of civil litigation as an instrument of
social change. That is an idea that would not, I think, have occurred
to most Americans in 1935. Ordinary civil litigation claims for itself
the mantle of social justice: the powerful shall be held to account by
the weak, a theme as ancient as the Psalms of the Old Testament. 99
Civil litigation in this guise presents itself not as governmentally
sponsored dispute resolution but as a form of social reform and as the
vindication of rights, typically of those occupying a subordinate social
position. Films like Erin Brockovich, A Civil Action, The Rainmaker,
and others'0 0 testify to the hold of this image on the popular mind:
civil litigation has become an avenue for changing the status quo, for
challenging the powerful, for rearranging the economic and political

98. In part this may be because many such cases require the engagement of experts and the
compilation of significant statistical data, which is costly-and the costs were not covered until
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 113, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (adding subsection
(c) to codified 42 U.SC. § 1988). Even so, awarding experts' fees remains in the courts' discretion.
42 U.S.C. §1988(c) (2004).
99. C.S. Lewis has remarked that a characteristic stance of the psalmist is that of a plaintiff
in a civil action, having suffered wrong, and appealing for justice, which, to the psalmist, will
entail a judgment for the plaintiff. C. S. LEWIS, REFLECTIONS ON THE PSALMS 9-19 (Collins 1961)
(1958).
100. ERIN BROCKOVICH (Jersey Films 2000); A CIVIL ACTION (Touchstone Pictures, Paramount Pictures, Wildwood Enterprises, Scott Rudin Productions 1998); THE RAINMAKER (American Zoetrope, Constellation Films, Douglas/Reuther Productions 1997). One would want to add
to this list at least PHILADELPHIA (Clinica Estetico Ltd., Tristar Pictures 1993), CLASS ACTION
(20th Century Fox, Interscope Communications 1991), and in the foreign film category, THE
CASTLE (Working Dog 1997).
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landscape, for, in the phrase used to title this Symposium, "achieving
social change through litigation."
This conception is vigorously contested. The Insurance
Institute, the Chamber of Commerce, and similar organizations have
mounted vigorous challenges to the plaintiffs' "movement," and there
are some who offer evidence that these efforts have in part
succeeded.101 For purposes of my argument it is sufficient that the
defense bar has seen the reorganized plaintiffs' bar as sufficiently
powerful to require a response of this sort. It is hard to imagine such
a response in 1935 or 1950, or even 1960. For more evidence of the
force of this change, one can look to Congress. In the past ten years,
under both Democratic and Republican Congresses, we have seen
legislation-some passed, some proposed-aimed either at segments of
the plaintiffs' bar or at that bar more generally. The Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998102 testifies to the success of
a segment of the bar that took to heart-and, some would argue, to
pocketbook as well-the message of Kalven and Rosenfield, by
creating an active and successful plaintiffs' securities bar that has
supplemented and perhaps supplanted the enforcement efforts of
public agencies. Congress, believing that this segment of the bar has
been too successful, or successful in the wrong cases, has acted to
impair its activities. 10 3 Again, for my purposes it is not important
whether Congress is correct in this judgment. Correct or not, it is
difficult to imagine Congress in 1935, or 1953, believing that any
segment of the plaintiffs' bar had enough significance to warrant
legislation.
Nor is the fight confined to securities litigation. Recently
introduced federal legislation would cap some medical malpractice

101. See generally William A. Lovett, Exxon Valdez, Punitive Damages, and Tort Reform, 38
TORT & INS. PRAc. L.J. 1071, 1105-1112 (2003) (describing specific areas of modern tort reform as
they have developed out of the tension between business and insurance on the one hand and the
plaintiffs' bar on the other: "The heart of the modern tort reform controversy is a reaction to the
widely perceived 'excesses' of the U.S. tort and punitive damages system. A growing range of
business, industrial, insurance, professional, farming, and even consumer interests now see excessive, burdensome, and even outrageous costs and disruptions from many tort and punitive
damages claims and awards - especially the upper tail of larger claims, verdicts, and awards...
. In response, the plaintiffs' bar, notably the American Trial Lawyers Association, together with
other consumer advocates and scholars, have objected to these restrictions and cutbacks.").
102. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2004).
103. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 et seq
(2004); Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2004) (both increasing the difficulty of filing securities fraud claims); Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2004,
H.R.4571, 108th Cong. (2004) (amending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 to its pre-1993 form
and making it applicable to state court suits involving interstate commerce).
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recoveries.10 4 As interesting as the details is the rhetoric. For
proponents of the bill, it is a struggle between the People and The
Lawyers. "It's time for my colleagues to take a stand and decide
whether they are with the mothers and the children or with the
personal injury lawyers," said Senator Jim Bunning, a Republican
from Kentucky. 10 5 For opponents, not surprisingly, the sides are
differently defined: "Instead of looking at ways to reduce medical
errors so that there would be fewer lawsuits, instead what they've said
is, 'we've got to help these big insurance companies.' Not help the
individual states, not help the people involved, but help the big
insurance companies," said Senator Patrick Leahy, a Democrat from
Vermont. 10 6 These debates mark the mature emergence of a segment
of the bar. Congressional debates about whether plaintiffs' lawyers
are a threat to the nation constitute a backhanded form of recognition
for a reorganized and recapitalized segment of the legal profession.
Deep within this transformation lies an apparent paradox to
which I believe that Brown is, again, the key. On its face, civil
litigation appears to be a market-oriented alternative to regulation.
One can imagine a regime of economic regulation in which tort and
contract, reinforced by criminal law, were the only regulatory regimes:
in some libertarian visions of society this appears to be the aspiration.
For such a regime to operate, of course, one would need plaintiffs and
their lawyers as well as defendants and theirs. Plaintiffs' lawyers
would not be the enemy in such a regime, any more than buyers are
the enemy in a market economy.
They would instead be the
representatives of the invisible regulatory hand, achieving though the
outcome of numerous lawsuits the optimal degree of product safety,
risk, and reward in a market for claims. One might imagine that
those who attached high value to deregulation would embrace civil
litigation as its alternative. One might further imagine that the
lawyers who ran such an apparatus would be natural recruits to the
political party of deregulation and that such a party would see them
as natural allies-the purveyors of the antidote to governmental
regulation-civil litigation. Life, of course, is different. As a group,
plaintiffs' lawyers currently ally themselves politically with the
Democratic Party. And currently, the Republican Party has, as an
104. Healthy
(2004) ("A bill to
care by reducing
and gynecological
105. Jesse J.
NEWSWIRES, Feb.
106. Id.

Mothers and Healthy Babies Access to Care Act of 2003, S. 2061, 108th Cong.
improve women's access to health care services and provide improved medical
the excessive burden the liability system places on the delivery of obstetrical
services").
Holland, Republicans Push Medical Malpractice Bill, ASSOCIATED PRESS
23, 2004.

20041

SILENT LITIGATION REVOLUTION

2003

important tenet, the proposition that much, if not all, civil litigationand certainly all brought by that malevolent group known as "the trial
lawyers"-is a social ill and a drag on the economy. There are many
reasons for this apparent misalignment, but I believe one of them has
roots in Brown. Once the Democratic Party, as a result of Lyndon
Johnson's push for the civil rights legislation in the mid-60s, had
aligned itself with the social movement represented by Brown, it
became the natural resting place for those lawyers who, at least in
rhetoric, and sometimes in reality, presented themselves as
vindicators of the rights of the oppressed against the powerful. That
alliance rests not on logic, but on the powerful ideological
reverberations of Brown within the U.S. legal profession.
Because Brown culminated what was for its time an
imaginative and unusual use of litigation, it challenged existing
conceptions of legal practice. Some of the challenges were cultural:
the movement represented in Brown allowed lawyers to see
themselves and their profession as potential actors in a broad drama
of social transformation.
That possibility has inspired several
generations of lawyers who, even in settings far removed from those of
Brown's architects, seek settings in which they can enact that drama.
Brown's other heir is the plaintiffs' bar. For the strategy behind
Brown to succeed, lawyers needed to seek clients; in the process of
blessing that process, the Supreme Court set in motion a chain of
events that led to substantial deregulation of the U.S. bar. We live
today in a world shaped by both.

